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RECENT DECISIONS
to put any quantity of self-serving ex parte statements before thejury, by simply employing an expert to give a few days' treatment
to the patient, and then putting the expert on the stand in this
dual capacity of expert and attending physician.19
The minority view is stated in the Ritter case and seems to be the main
reason why these courts so hold:
The rationale of the Kath rule regards statements made by the
patient to the physician as hearsay and in the nature of self-serv-
ing declarations. Kath allows testimony concerning such state-
ments where made to a physician while undergoing treatment, but
excludes the testimony where dual motivation is established. This
distinction is unrealistic. If the testimony on statements made in
one context is admissible then logically such testimony should
also be admissible where the statements are made in the other
context.
As long as a patient goes to a physician with the bona fide
purpose of receiving treatment, the basic desire of a patient to
get well, we believe, will generally motivate him to tell the truth
and this is sufficient reason to allow the attending physician to
testify about statements made to him which may touch on his
history and his subjective symptoms. Cross examination and ar-
gument are available to opposing counsel as a means of testing
such testimony.20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in rendering this decision has done
nothing more than to recognize that which it has side-stepped up to
now. That is, to be able to tell the difference between when a man goes
to the doctor for treatment only and when he goes for the dual purpose
of treatment and testimony is for all practical purposes nearly im-
possible.
The court now must assume that the patient will not lie to a physi-
cian when his basic desire is to get well. This holding also means that
the court relies on two checks to defeat the admission of untruthful
statements: First, the belief that the physician will know if and when
the patient is lying about pain or sickness, from his vast store of medi-
cal knowledge; secondly, the system of cross-examination which will
glean out the inconsistencies in any testimony of a doubtful nature.21
TIMOTHY P. KENNY
Code Practice: Pain and Suffering: Per Injury Argument: In
Doolittle v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co.' the defendant's intestate
collided with a vehicle in which the plaintiff, Myra Doolittle, was a
19 121 Wis. at 512, 99 N.W. at 220.
20 24 Wis. 2d at 165, 128 N.W. 2d at 443.
21 Felkl v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 24 Wis. 2d 595, 129 N.W. 2d 222 (1964);
the supreme court affirmed its holdings in the Ritter case.24 Wis. 2d 135, 128 N.W. 2d 403 (1964).
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passenger. The trial court found the defendant 100 per cent negligent
and awarded the plaintiff $45,000 for pain and suffering and personal
injuries. Counsel for the plaintiff, in their initial oral argument before
the jury, asked the jury several questions such as "Is blank dollars too
much for plaintiff's fractured ribs ?-2 and further went on to argue the
following dollar amounts:
Injury to right leg ................................. $12,500
Injury to left arm ................................. 7,500
Injury to head and scar ............................ 8,000
Fractured ribs .................................... 10,000
H eart injury ...................................... 10,000
H ammer toes ..................................... 2,500
Total ............................. $50,500
Counsel for the defendant objected to this in motions after verdict.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after briefly reviewing
the decision in Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp.,3 held
that "where there are two or more distinct items of injury .. . it is
proper for the trial court to permit argument to the jury whereby a
separate sum is urged upon the jury for each of such injuries."'4
It has always been the rule and custom in American jury trials to
confine argument to the issues, but reasonable latitude has generally
been accorded counsel in applying the rule.5 Counsel may draw infer-
ences, even if contrary to other evidence; but counsel has not been al-
lowed to "draw inferences where there are no grounds for them in the
evidence." 6
The basis of the problem of the instant case can be found in cases
dealing with suggestion of dollar value for pain and suffering on a
unit of time basis in closing argument.7 The landmark case in this area
2 Record, p. 34; Brief for Appellant p. 102.
3 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W. 2d 274 (1960), 86 A.L.R. 2d 227.
424 Wis. 2d at 143, 128 N.W. 2d at 407.
5 53 Azi. JUR. Trial § 463 (1945).688 C.J.S. Trial § 181 (1955).
7 Cases not permitting such argument include: Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler,
283 Fed. 881 (8th Cir. 1922); Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (6th
Cir. 1956); Vaughan v. Magee, 218 Fed. 630 (3d Cir. 1914); Bowers v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 182 F. Supp. 756 (D.Del. 1960); Wuth v. United States,
161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958); Stein v. Meyer, 150 F. Supp. 365 (E.D.
Pa. 1957) ; Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P. 2d
337 (1961); Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal. 2d 353 (1946); Gorczyca v. New
York, N. H. & H. Ry., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A. 2d 589 (1954); Cooley v. Cri-
spino, 21 Conn. Supp. 150, 147 A. 2d 497 (1958); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del.
369, 146 A. 2d 394 (1958) ; Franco v. Fujimoto, 390 P. 2d 740 (Hawaii 1964) ;
Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206 (1962); Jenson v. Elgin,J. & E. Ry., 24 Ill. 2d 383, 182 N.E. 2d 211 (1962); Caylor v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P. 2d 53 (1962); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.
2d 588 (Mo. 1959); Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 329 S.W. 2d 14
(Mo. 1959) ; Chamberlain v. Palmer Lumber, Inc., 104 N.H. 221. 183 A. 2d 906(1962); Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 182 A. 2d 451 (1962); Mathis v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 61 N.M. 330, 300 P. 2d 483 (1956); King v. Railway
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is Botta v. Brunner," in which counsel for the plaintiff argued before
the jury: "Would 50c an hour for that type of suffering be too high ?"'
The court there held that the sole reason for the use of a mathematical
formula argument such as this was to influence the jury by bringing
to their attention matters not supported by the evidence.' 0
In the Wisconsin counterpart to the Botta case, Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transp. Corp.,:" counsel for the plaintiff set forth on the
blackboard figures by which counsel mathematically computed a claimed
pain and suffering award by multiplying an arbitrary $1.50 per day by
plaintiff's life expectancy. The court said: "The use of a mathematical
formula is pure speculation by counsel which is not supported by the
Express Agency, 107 N.W. 2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Hall v. Booth, 178 N.E. 2d
619 (Ohio 1961); Boop v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 118 Ohio App. 171, 193 N.E.
2d 714 (1963) ; Clark v. Essex Wire Corp., 361 Pa. 60, 63 A. 2d 35 (1949) ;
Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 At. 111 (1936); Herb v. Hallowell, 304
Pa. 128, 154 Atl. 582 (1931) ; Bullock v. Chester & Darby Telford Road Co.,
270 Pa. 295, 113 Atl. 379 (1921); Joyce v. Smith, 269 Pa. 439, 112 Atl. 549
(1921) ; Ruby v. Casello, 201 A. 2d 219 (Pa. Super. 1964) ; Harper v. Bolton,
229 S.C. 541, 124 S.E. 2d 54 (1962); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v.
Odom, 227 S.C. 167, 116 S.E. 2d 22 (1960); Certified T.V. & Appliance Co.
v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E. 2d 126 (1959) ; Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.
2d 18 (W. Va. 1961); Armstead v. Holbert, 122 S.E. 2d 43 (W. Va. 1961).
Cases permitting such argument include: Drlik v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 141
F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1955), aff'd, 23 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 941 (1956); Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288 F. 2d 262 (6th Cir.
1961) ; Bowers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 281 F. 2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Evening
Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A. 2d 377 (D.D.C. 1962); Petition of Gulf
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.N.N.Y. 1959); Newbury v. Vogel, 379 P. 2d 811
(Cal. 1963); Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364
P. 2d 337, 56 Cal. 2d 498 (1961); Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 96
So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1957) ; Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959) ; An-
drews v. Condosa, 97 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1957) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Brad-
dock, 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955); Evansville City Coach Lines v. Atherton,
133 Ind. App. 304, 179 N.E. 2d 293 (1962) ; Indiana Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bone,
180 N.E. 2d 375 (Ind. App. 1962); Corkery v. Greenberg, 114 N.W. 2d 327
(Iowa 1962) ; Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W. 2d 155 (Ky. 1960) ;
Little v. Hughes, 136 So. 2d 448 (La. 1961) ; Lebow v. Reichel, 231 Md. 421,
190 A. 2d 642 (1963); Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 180 A. 2d
681 (Md. 1962); Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177
A. 2d 701 (1962) ; Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W. 2d 828 (1961);
Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W. 2d 633 (1958);
Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d 30 (1957);
Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); Four County Elec. Power
Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954), 44 A.L.R. 2d 1191; John-
son v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P. 2d 754 (1959); Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R. v. Jones, 354 P. 2d 415 (Okla. 1960) ; Edwards v. Lawton, 136 S.E. 2d
708 (S.C. 1964); Continental Bus System v. Toombs, 325 S.W. 2d 153 (Tex.
1959); Mid-Tex Dev. Co. v. McJunkin, 369 S.W. 2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P. 2d
575 (1960) ; Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P. 2d 153 (1960).
See generally 17 ARi. L. Rxv. 94 (1963); 11 Ci.Ev.-MAa. L. REv. 495
(1962); 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 317 (1963); 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 189 (1962);
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 269; 11 KAN. L. REv. 170 (1963); 22 LA. L. REv. 461 (1962);
16 OKLA. L. REV. 468 (1963); 36 TEMP. L. Q. 98 (1963); 15 VAND. L. REv.
1303 (1962) ; 2 WASHBURN L. J. 171 (1963) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R. 2d 1396 (1954);
Annot., 60 A.L.R. 2d 1347 (1958) ; Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 239 (1962).
826 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713 (1958).
9 138 A. 2d at 718.
20 Id. at 723.
2 111 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W. 2d 274 (1960).
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evidence and presents matters that do not appear in the record.' 1 2 The
court went on to say:
The basic reasoning behind the use of any mathematical form-
ula is not so much to aid, or even to persuade, the jury as it is to
ultimately establish a fixed standard to displace the jury's con-
cept of what is a fair and reasonable amount to compensate for
pain and suffering sustained as shown by the evidence in the
light of common knowledge and experience possessed by the jury
of the nature of pain and suffering and the value of money.13
In a later Wisconsin case, counsel argued to the jury in attempting
to establish a figure on damages: "I am asking you to consider
$25,000."14 The court expressly refused to broaden the scope of the
Affett case. "In our opinion, it is consistent with the concept of 'reason-
able latitude in argument' that counsel be permitted to urge upon the
jurors such figures as he considers to be fairly supported by the evi-
dence."25 As dicta in the case the court said that it would approve of
the principle that broad latitude should be given to counsel in suggesting
a lump sum to the jury, but went on to say that "it does not follow that
appeals to passion may be made in connection with damages."1 "
It seems evident that if the rationale of these cases is based on the
speculative element involved in argument not based on the evidence,
then this trilogy of cases is totally unresolvable. Regardless of whether
counsel argues for lump sum, per diem, or per injury, the amount asked
for is speculative, based upon little more than counsel's fancy. It would
therefore appear that the speculative element per se does not constitute
an inherent evil unless the speculative element is so constituted that it
loses its character of mere argument and becomes obscured by a decep-
tive facade of mathematical certainty. The evil of per diem argument
lies in its tendency to hide its speculative basis in the intricacies of
mathematical factoring, suggesting that the issue turns on the correct-
ness of the mathematics. The jury may easily be induced thereby to
divert its attention from the propriety of the unit amount suggested
and simply to approve counsel's mathematics. Thus, the objection is to
the "short circuiting" of the jury's normal thinking process; this is what
is mean by the phrase "invading the province of the jury."
If counsel in the Doolittle case, rather than dividing the sum into
separate amounts for each injury, would have reduced it to a definite
amount for each injured cubic inch on the plaintiff's body, it is pre-
dictable that the court would have condemned the process. In terms of
its effect upon jury deliberations, the argument employed in Affett dif-
12 Id. at 612, 106 N.W. 2d at 279.
13 Id. at 613, 106 N.W. 2d at 279.
'4 Halstead v. Kosnar, 18 Wis. 2d 348, 350, 118 N.W. 2d 864, 866 (1963).
15 Id. at 352, 118 N.W. 2d at 866.
16 Ibid.
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fered only in that it was slightly more sophisticated in its selection of a
basis for the computation.
What the court is trying to protect, it seems, is the jury's preroga-
tive to use their own mental processes, not too strongly impaired by
argument based on speculation beyond the record, to determine what
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Arguments which tend to "short cir-
cuit" these mental processes through the use of formulas which distract
the jury stand on the same ground as passion or prejudice, and are
equivolently disallowed. The court ably pointed this out in the Affett
case when it said that the only purpose in using the mathematical form-
ula argument was to "displace the jury's concept of what is a fair and
reasonable amount to compensate for pain and suffering."1 7
The author feels that the proper distinction was made by the Illinois
court in Caley v. Manicke,18 which involved a fact situation similar to
the Affett and Botta cases. The court there stated in relation to the
monetary award of the jury for pain and suffering: "This determina-
tion like many others that a jury must make is left to its conscience and
judgment. A determination reached by a speculative process which is
easier to comprehend than to define and upon which just and wise men
may disagree does not indicate that it is a 'blind guess.' "19 The Illinois
court also held in a case2 0 similar to Wisconsin's Halstead case that a
lump sum argument to the jury is proper. The court reaffirmed this posi-
tion in the Caley case, saying: "[W]e consider such practice far less
misleading than the argument of a mathematical formula .... ,"2, This is
essentially what the Wisconsin court has held.
Louis J. ANDREW, JR.
Dometic Relations: Domicile of Military Personnel: The plain-
tiff in Lauterbach v. Lauterbachl was a member of the United States
Air Force who had been stationed in Alaska under military orders since
July, 1960. Nine months previous to the bringing of a divorce action
in an Alaska court, he had filed a complaint for a divorce in Pennsyl-
vania, the state of his marriage. The defendant wife contended that by
so doing, the plaintiff had shown a lack of intent to treat Alaska as his
permanent residence. The Alaska statutes provide that
no person may commence an action for divorce until he has been
a resident of the state for at least one year before the commence-
ment of the action.2
17 1 Wis. 2d at 613, 106 N.W. 2d at 279.
Is 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206 (1962).
19 Id. at 393, 182 N.E. 2d at 208.
20 Graham v. Mattoon City R.R., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N.E. 1070 (1909).
21 Caley v. Manicke, supra note 18, at 394, 182 N.E. 2d at 209.
1392 P. 2d 24 (Alaska 1964).2 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.140 (1964).
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